Kripke and the Semantics of Proper Names

Hojatti, Seyed Mohammad Ali; Kashi, Mohsen

Kripke and the Semantics of Proper Names

Document Type : Research Article

Authors

Seyed Mohammad Ali Hojatti ¹

Mohsen Kashi ²

¹ Associate Professor, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.

² Master of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University

Abstract

If we assume that words are a kind of symbols, then a semantic theory goes to enlighten meanings of these symbols .In natural language, we consider terms like “Scott” and “Socrates”, as proper names. There are two strategies – descriptive and non-descriptive – about semantics of proper names.
In description theories of proper names, to which Frege, Russell and Searle are committed; a definite description or a cluster of descriptions identifies semantic content of a proper name. However, Mill holds that a proper name has not any connotation and its meaning is the very object to which it refers. Kripke, too, denies all sorts of description theories of proper names and holds that a proper name has not any descriptive content, so we may consider him as a Millian .The non-descriptive view of proper name comes across some problems such as: How can we justify the difference in cognitive values of some identities? How can we justify the difference in truth conditions of attitude ascriptions? How the sentences, which contain empty names, are meaningful?
Millians such as Kripke, Salmon and Braun have attempted to solve these problems. In this article, their solutions will be explained and criticized.

Keywords

Proper name

definite description

empty name

cognitive value

attitude ascriptions

semantics

pragmatics

reference (referent)

and meaning

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