One objection made against the temporal parts theory is Haslanger’s causal message argument. Haslanger argues that instantaneous temporal parts view cannot explain changes in natural objects and so it should be abandoned. In the present paper, endorsing soundness of Haslanger’s argument, I make another objection to the mentioned view from the innumerability of instantaneous temporal parts involving in the constitution of any natural object. Then, I introduce and defend the idea that we may consider temporal parts as durable rather than instantaneous. In the remaining sections, scrutinizing this idea, I explain how it is possible to defeat two mentioned objections by relying on the idea of durable temporal parts
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