The Constitution View of Human Persons

Zakeri, Mahdi

doi:10.22096/ek.2021.523667.1314

The Constitution View of Human Persons

Document Type : Research Article

Author

Mahdi Zakeri

Associate Professor, Faculty of Theology, Tehran University, Tehran , Iran.

10.22096/ek.2021.523667.1314

Abstract

Based on Constitution view, Baker claims that human persons neither have an immaterial soul which can exist independently of body (immaterialism), and nor are animals (animalism). Human persons are a part of natural world, albeit a distinguished one. What makes something a person is the first-person perspective. Initially, human infants have consciousness and develop self-consciousness during their growth, and can perceive themselves from the first-person perspective. At the outset, they possess no concept and learning to use a language gradually, acquire concepts, including self-concept, and survive while they have first-person perspective. Persons are not identical to their bodies; a person and his body have different persistence conditions, so personal identity is independent from physical identity. It may change a person's body gradually while first-person perspective and person are remained. Present paper first explains Baker’s constitution view of human persons and then answers criticisms of its account of personal identity. Among the criticisms of this view is that the first-person perspective does not persist over time and is divisible and duplicable; thus, it cannot be a criterion for personal identity. Additionally, some thought experiments indicate that the first-person perspective cannot be a proper criterion for personal identity.

Keywords

Lynn R. Baker

Constitution view

Person

Personal Identity

Animalism

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