One of the central questions in philosophy of perception concerns the relationship between science of perception and perceptual experience. In this paper, my aim isn’t to answer the question, rather to track it in the recent debate in philosophy of perception: Disjunctivism versus Intentionalism. In particular, I study the question in the context of the discussions between McDowell and Burge, as the two representatives of those rival theories. McDowell defends the epistemological disjunctivism. At the opposite, Burge argues that disjunctivism is incompatible with the foundation of natural sciences. McDowell replies that scientific individuation and epistemological individuation are different, but not incompatible. Science is fundamentally not about perceptual experience; rather it explains the conditions under which perceptual experience is possible. Burge, rejecting the view, states that McDowell would like to isolate philosophy from empirical knowledge. Detailed study of the discussions reveals that the confrontation, at least at its core, concerns the topic which is beyond the scope of just building a theory for perceptual experience. It seems that the two belong to the two fundamentally different philosophical traditions or theoretical frameworks. At the end, it seems plausible to conclude that we cannot choose between one of those rival theories in philosophy of perception, unless we, in advance, determine the role of naturalism in philosophy.