This article offers a critical re-examination of ʿAbd al-ʿAlī Lakhnawī, the earliest Indian annotator of al-Ufuq al-Mubīn, and his engagement with the foundations of the theory of existence in Yamānī Wisdom. It asks on what conceptual pillars Mīr Dāmād constructs his account of the maṭābaq (truth-maker) of the hal basīṭ propositions and of the relation between existence and essence, and on what grounds Lakhnawī rejects them. The study first surveys the development of the problem of existence—from the debate over ʿurūḍ versus iʿtibār to its logical formulation in terms of the maṭābaq of the hal basīṭ. It then explicates Mīr Dāmād’s position in al-Ufuq al-Mubīn, grounded in the semantic simplicity of existence, the analysis of “A is existent” as “A is realized in mind or external reality,” and an intentional distinction between taqarrur (subsistence) and existence. Within this framework, the relation between the simple origination (jaʿl basīṭ) of quiddity and the truth of existential predication is articulated through istitbāʿ (entailment). Finally, the article evaluates Lakhnawī’s criticisms across four axes—predication theory, the simplicity of “existent,” the dual classification of hal basīṭ, and the principle of derivative predication—arguing that some objections reflect fundamental metaphysical divergences, while others stem from misinterpretations and insufficient attention to key technical distinctions.