

An Explanation of Meaning and Content of Propositions according to the Deflationary Theory of Truth

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Abstract

According to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a proposition is true does not add any properties to that proposition. However, most of the theories of content and meaning take the concept of truth as a fundamental semantic concept and define other semantic concepts, such as meaning, according to it. In this article, we tried to show how it is possible to substitute the verification conditions instead of the concept of truth and justify the objective and social aspect of propositions through the users of a language. Also, we tried to show how semantic properties of the logical operators could be explained according to the deflationary conception of truth. Logical operators act as connectives for complex contents and without a deflationary explanation of their rule in sentences or arguments, our survey would be incomplete. Here we explained this rule according to the syntax of formal logic and accepted the equivalence schema as a universal proposition.

Keywords: Deflationary Theory of Truth; Theory of Content; Truth; Verification; Semantic of Logical Operators.

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