Existence and Knowledge

Existence and Knowledge

The Argument from Progress for Moral Realism

Document Type : Research Article

Author
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Abstract

Moral progress is one of the concepts and phenomena that is increasingly being discussed. Apart from the independent significance of progress, it also plays a role in arguments in moral philosophy. Specifically, a textbook argument against relativism is that it renders moral progress meaningless. Here, I discuss another argument that has received less attention: the argument from progress for moral realism. The realization of progress is a reason for a minimal form of moral realism. We can compare this argument with two other arguments. One is the argument against realism based on disagreement. The argument from progress is another aspect of the same argument, although with better support. The other is the argument for scientific realism, which the argument from progress follows in a similar pattern.

Keywords: Moral realism; Moral progress; Normativity; Relativism; Disagreement.

Keywords: Moral realism; Moral progress; Normativity; Relativism; Disagreement.

Keywords: Moral realism; Moral progress; Normativity; Relativism; Disagreement.
Keywords
Subjects

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