نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.
2 دانشیار دپارتمان فلسفه، دانشگاه مفید، تهران، ایران
3 استاد دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
حذف‌گرایی ماده‌باور یکی از دیدگاه‌های مطرح در فلسفه ذهن است که بنا بر آن، روانشناسی عامیانه، به مثابه یک نظریه عرفی درباره رفتار انسان، نظریه‌ای کاذب است. یعنی، برخی یا تمام حالات ذهنی که روانشناسی عامیانه پیش می‌نهد، تحقق ندارند و از امری واقعی در عالم خارج حکایت نمی‌کنند. بنابراین، از نظر حذف‌گرایان، روانشناسی عامیانه باید کنار گذاشته شده و با روانشناسی علمی جایگزین شود. در این مقاله با بیان استدلال‌های موافقین و مخالفین حذف‌گرایی، سعی می‌کنیم نشان دهیم روانشناسی عامیانه نظریه‌ای کاذب نیست و حالات ذهنی واقعاً تحقق دارند. در نتیجه، حذف‌گرایی ماده‌باور دیدگاهی کاذب است. به علاوه، نشان می‌دهیم با تمایز نهادن میان علم حضوری و حصولی می‌توان دلیل محکمی علیه این دیدگاه ارائه داد. معرفت ما به حالات ذهنی مثل باور، میل، امید و ترس، از نوع علم حضوری است، به طوری که وجود این حالات را در خودمان بی‌واسطه می‌یابیم. بنابراین، انکار آن‌ها توسط حذف‌گرایی ماده‌باور، توجیه قابل اعتمادی ندارد.
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
Critical Evaluation of Eliminative Materialism
نویسندگان [English]
- Fakhrosadat Moosavi Karimi 1
- Mir Saeid Moosavi Karimi 2
- Reza Akbarian 3
- Mohammad Saeedi Mehr 3
1 Ph.D. Student in Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Mofid University, Tehran, Iran
3 Professor in Philosophy and Islamic Theology, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده [English]
According to eliminative materialism, folk psychology, as a common-sense theory about human behavior, is false; that is, most or all mental states that are posited by this theory do not exist, and hence its terms refer to nothing real. So, the eliminitivist believes that folk psychology should be rejected and replaced by scientific psychology. In this paper, after explaining the arguments for and against eliminativism, we will try to show that folk psychology is not a false theory, and mental states and entities do exist. Moreover, by making a distinction between knowledge by presence and non-presential knowledge, it will be shown that we can provide a further strong argument against eliminativism. Our knowledge to mental states such as beliefs, desires, hopes, fears and the like is knowledge by presence such that we find these entities without any doubt and immediately in our minds. So, rejecting their actuality by eliminativism is not justified.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
- Keywords: Eliminativism
- Folk Psychology
- Propositional Attitude
- knowledge by presence
- Non-Presential Knowledge
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