Many philosophers have discussed conscience—specifically moral conscience—and put forward various perspectives. Among them is Allameh Jafari, who has addressed this issue more extensively than other contemporary thinkers; yet, his works contain a corresponding number of ambiguous and contradictory statements regarding the existential nature of conscience, without offering a resolution to these conflicts. The most significant of these contradictions are that conscience is simultaneously potential and actual; it can weaken without vanishing, yet also cease to exist entirely; it is both singular and manifold; and it possesses an existential mode that is purely cognitive, purely motive, or a combination of both. This article aims to identify, examine, and analyze the aforementioned challenges and contradictions by studying the complete works of Allameh [Jafari] using a descriptive-analytical method. The findings indicate that a superficial comparison of Allameh Jafari’s various statements regarding the existential characteristics of conscience suggests a genuine contradiction in his thought; unless a justification or solution is offered to reconcile these views, his perspective remains ambiguous, contradictory, and incomplete, leaving his final position on the specific existential attributes of conscience unclear.