Gottlob Frege, in his essay “On Sense and Reference” (1892), distinguished between “sense” and “reference,” providing a fundamental framework for analyzing the meaning of expressions, especially proper names. Saul Kripke, in Naming and Necessity, provided a different explanation of the fixation and transfer of reference by criticizing descriptive theories of proper names and proposing a theory of causal-historical signification. The main issue of the research is whether Kripke’s criticism of Frege’s theory encompasses all its dimensions or is mainly focused on a specific reading, namely the descriptive interpretation of proper names. Using an analytical-documentary method and comparing the original texts of Frege and Kripke, the research analyzes the relationship between “sense as a mode of presentation,” descriptiveism, and Kripke’s theory of signification.The findings show that identifying Fregean "sense" with a specific description that is equivalent to the meaning of a proper name requires an independent argument, and Kripke's critique cannot be directly considered a critique of all components of Frege's theory. By separating the semantic-cognitive level from the mechanism of reference fixation and transfer, the relationship between the two theories can be examined not simply in terms of conflict, but in terms of the possibility of a complementary reading.