منابع
1- ابن سینا، منطق شفا، قم، مکتبه آیه الله المرعشی النجفی، 1363.
2- ارسطو، ارغنون، ادیب سلطانی، تهران، انتشارات نگاه، 1378.
3- تیدمن، پل و هاوارد کهین، درآمدی نو به منطق، منطقهای قیاسی. استقرایی. موجهات. معرفتی. بایایی و نظامهای اصل موضوعی، رضا اکبری، تهران، انتشارات دانشگاه امام صادق، چاپ اول، 1383.
4- خواجه طوسی، اساس الاقتباس، به تصحیح مدرس رضوی، تهران، انتشارات دانشگاه تهران، 1326.
5- موحد، ضیاء، درآمدی به منطق جدید، تهران، شرکت انتشارات علمی و فرهنگی، چاپ اول، 1368.
6- موحد، ضیاء، ، منطق موجهات، تهران، انتشارات هرمس، چاپ اول، 1381.
7- نبوی، لطف الله، مبانی منطق جدید، تهران، انتشارات سمت، چاپ اول، 1377.
8- نبوی، لطف الله، مبانی منطق موجهات، تهران، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، 1383.
9- هاک، سوزان، فلسفه منطق، سید محمد علی حجتی، قم، کتاب طه، زمستان 1382.
2)منابع تکثرگرایی در منطق
1- Beal, J.C. and Greg Restall, “Defending Logical Pluralism”, Logical Consequences: papers from the 1999 Society for Exact Philosophy Conference. Bryson Brown and John Woods, eds. Stanmore: Hermes, 2002. References to pdf version found at: [http://www.phil.mq.edu.au/staff/grestall/files/defplur.pdf].
2- Beall, J.C. and Greg Restall, “Logical Pluralism” Australasian Journal of Philosophy,78, 2000, 475-493.
3- Bueno. O, “Can a Paraconsistent Theorist be a Logical Monist?”, in Carnielli, Coniglio, and D'Ottaviano (eds.) 2002.
4- Goddu, G. C, What Exactly is Logical Pluralism? Australasian Journal of philosophy. 80. 218-230, 2002.
5- Haack, Susan, Philosophy of Logics. London: CambridgeUniversity Press. 1978.
6- Nolt, John, Logics, London, Wordsworth, 1997.
7- Quine, Willard Van Orman, Philosophy of Logic, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970.
8- Priest, Graham, “Logic: One or Many?” in Brown and Woods (eds.) Logical Consequences: papers from the 1999 Society for Exact Philosophy Conference, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002.
9- Resnik, Michael, “Ought There To Be But One Logic?”, In Jack Copeland, editor, Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.
10- Restall, Greg, “Logical Pluralism and the Preservatin of Warrant”, 2000, On Line.
11- Wyatt, Nicole, “What Are Beall and Restall Pluralists About?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, 3, 2004.
3) منابع منطقهای رقیب
3-1) مجموعه منطقهای رقیب
1- Gabbay Dov M. and Franz Günthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984-6.
2- Goble, Lou, The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2001.
3- Priest. Graham, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 2001.
3-2) منطق ربط
1- Anderson Alan Ross and Nuel D. Belnap. Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, volume I. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975.
2- Dunn, J. Michael. “Relevance Logic and Entailment”. In Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Günthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, volume 3, pages 117–229. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986.
3- Mares, Edwin D. and Robert K. Meyer, in Lou Goble, “Relevant Logic”, The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2001.
4- Mares, Edwin D, Relevant Logic, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2004.
5- Meyer Robert K. and Errol P. Martin, “Logic on the Australian Plan”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:305–332, 1986.
6- Meyer Robert K. and Errol P. Martin. “On Establishing the Converse”. Logique et Analyse, 139–140:207–222, 1992.
7- Restall, Greg. “Negation in Relevant Logics”: How I stopped worrying and learned to love the Routley star”. In Dov Gabbay and Heinrich Wansing, editors, What is Negation, volume 13 of Applied Logic Series, pages 53–76. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
8- Read, Stephen. Relevant Logic. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988.
9- Tennant, Neil. “The Transmission of Truth and the Transitivity of Deduction”. In Dov Gabbay, editor, What is a Logical System?, volume 4 of Studies in Logic and Computation, pages 161–177. OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, 1994.
3-3) منطق شهودگرا
1- Brouwer, L. E. J, “Intuitionismus”, D. van Dalen, ed., (Bibligraphisches Institut, Wissenschaftsverlag, Mannheim), 1992.
2- Dummett, Michael. Elements of Intuitionism. OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, 1977.
3- Tait, W. W. “Against Intuitionism: Constructive Mathematics is Part of Classical Mathematics”. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 12: 173–195, 1983.
4- Van Dalen, Dirk, “Intuitionistuc Logic”. In Dov M. Gabbay and Franz G¨Unthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, volume 3, pages 225-339. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986.
5- Van Dalen, Dirk, “Intuitionistic Logic”,In Lou Goble, The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2001.
3-4) منطق فراسازگار
1- Carnielli, W., Coniglio, M., and D'Ottaviano, I. (eds.): Paraconsistency: The Logical Way to the Inconsistent. New York: Marcel Dekker, 2002.
3-5) منطق غیرصوری
2- Tarski, A.: Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. (Translated by J.H. Woodger. Second edition, edited by John Corcoran.) Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983.
3- Etchemendy, John. “Tarski on truth and logical consequence”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 53(1):51–79, 1988.
4- Etchemendy, John, The Concept of Logical Consequence, HarvardUniversity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990.
5- Mcgee, Vann. “Two Problems with Tarski’s Theory of Consequence”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 92:273–292, 1992.
