نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Various conceptions of deflationary theories of truth have been suggested since the beginning of the 20th century and have received significant attentions and support since then. This paper is an attempt to identify the proper criterion of counting a theory as a deflationist theory of truth. The claim that truth is not a property is often considered as the criterion of deflationism. Having argued that this criterion is not adequate, I have proposed a new criterion in its place. A theory should be considered deflationist, according to my criterion, if it implies that the questions to which the traditional theories of truth are supposed to provide answers should be dismissed. To set the stage for suggesting my criterion, I have, in the first part, surveyed these questions and then have explained why they have been considered significant
کلیدواژهها English