نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

کارشناس ارشد فلسفه و منطق دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی

چکیده

مک داول[1] معتقد است که گویندگان با اظهار التفاتی جملات زبان خود، به بیان اندیشه می‌پردازند. به عبارتی، رفتار زبانی گویندگان را باید انجام افعالی گفتاری در نظر گرفت که دارای محتوای مشخص (اندیشه‌ها) و نوع مشخص (همچون بیان اندیشه، درخواست، پرسش و غیره) هستند. مک داول با طرفداری از مفهوم اعتدال معتقد است که نظریه پرداز معنا، باید شخصی در نظر گرفته شود که دارای فهمی پیشینی از یک زبان، همچون فرا‌زبان است. اما به نظر دامت[2]، نظریة معنا نباید فهم بخشی از زبان را پیش‌فرض بگیرد. در نگاه او، این نظریه باید تمام مفاهیم اولیه زبان را تبیین کند و توضیح دهد که دارا بودن این مفاهیم به وسیلة گویندگان به چه معنا است. مک داول نیز با نقد این رهیافت تأکید می‌کند که دامت به دام رفتارگرایی محض خواهد افتاد و مجبور خواهد بود معنا را در عباراتی تحویلی و رفتاری تبیین کند، که چنین کاری، مخالف با این شهود بنیادین ما است که معنا عقلانی و هنجارین است. به این ترتیب، مک داول، اساسا ًارائه نظریه‌ای غیرمعتدل را ناممکن می‌داند. در این نوشته، علاوه بر طرح دیدگاه‌های دامت و مک داول در باب کارکرد یک نظریة معنا، استدلال مک داول را علیه نظریة غیرمعتدل معنا، بررسی و ارزیابی خواهیم کرد.



[1]. John McDowell


[2]. Michael Dummett

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Main Challenges between Dummett and McDowell on the Theory of Meaning and Adequate Description of Linguistic Behavior

نویسنده [English]

  • Ali Hossein Khani

Master of Philosophy and Logic, Allameh Tabatabai University

چکیده [English]

McDowell thinks that speakers, when they are uttering a sentence intentionally, in fact, are expressing a thought which the sentence is used for communication. In McDowell’s view, we must take speaker’s linguistic behavior as a performance of a speech act with a specific content (various thoughts) and specific type (such as expressing a thought, asking a question, and so on). McDowell defends a modest theory of meaning and argues that an interpreter or a theorist should be seen as a person who has and has had a prior grasp of a language. But, Dummett believes that a theory of meaning should not take for granted some piece of a language or presuppose having some primitive concepts of that language by a speaker. A theory of meaning, as Dummett says, must explain all primitive concepts which primitive terms of the language in question express, and describe what it is to have these concepts by a speaker. McDowell by criticizing this view insists that, this approach to meaning falls in the mere behaviorism and then, Dummett is forced to explain meaning in reductive and non-intentional (behavioral) terms. McDowell urges that giving this behavioral account of meaning attacks our intuitive and common sense view that language and meaning are normative and rational. Thus, giving an immodest theory of meaning, in McDowell’s view, is impossible. In this essay, after describing McDowell’s and Dummett’s views on workings of a theory of meaning, I will describe McDowell’s argument against possibility of giving an immodest theory of meaning and eventually, I’m going to evaluate the plausibility of the argument.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • : Modest Theory of Meaning
  • Theory of Force
  • the Notion of Content
  • McDowell
  • Dummett
  1. منابع

    1. Auxier, Randall E. & Hahn, Lewis Edwin, The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, U. S.America: Open Court, 2007.
    2. Black, Max and Geach, Peter, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, London: Basil Blackwell, second edition, 1960.
    3. Dummett, Michael, Frege: Philosophy of Language, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973.
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    8. ______________ , The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Massachusetts: Harvard, third printing, 1994.
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    11. Frege, Gottlob, (1892), "On Sense and Reference", In Black and Geach, 1960, pp. 56-78.
    12. ____________ , "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry", Mind, New Series, Vol. 65, 1956, No. 259, pp. 289-311.
    13. McDowell, John, (1976), "Truth-Conditions, Bivalence, and Verificationism", In McDowell, 1998, pp. 3-28.
    14. ____________ , (1977), "On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name". In McDowell, 1998, pp. 171-198.
    15. ____________ , (1987), "In Defence of Modesty", In McDowell, 1998, pp. 87-107.
    16. ____________ , (1997), "Another Plea for Modesty", In McDowell, 1998, pp. 108-131.
    17. ____________ , Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1998.
    18. ____________ , "Dummett on Truth Conditions and Meaning", In Auxier & Hahn, 2007, pp. 351-366.
    19. Miller, Alexander, Philosophy of Language, New York: Routledge, Second Edition, 2007.
    20. Riyadh, Sujan, In Defence of Dummett's Immodesty: A Reply to McDowell, Ottawa: University of Guelph, (MA Thesis), 2004.
    21. Thornton, Tim, John McDowell, Chesham, UK: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2004.

     

     

     

     

     

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