نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
Understanding is not matter of mind in Wittgenstein view. But this position is met with a protest called "scientific objection" as if the philosopher is simply ruling out something that neurologist or psychologist could discover. In this article we show that Wittgenstein did not resent the position of science and only denies the claim that science can provide an a priori account of understanding. In the general reading of Wittgenstein's view, understanding is seen as an ability. But this is at odds with the fact that understanding happens in an instant, and that is why we explained in this article the position of understanding is like the "beginning of ability" which considers both understanding in relation to ability and its occurrence. However, the denial of the subjectivity of understanding attributes an anti-realist stance on understanding to Wittgenstein. Therefore, with the help of McDowell's interpretation of Wittgenstein, we try to show that Wittgenstein considers the linguistic understanding as a certain state of mind in the language game. McDowell's interpretation, however, contradicts some of Wittgenstein's points, especially in Zettel.
کلیدواژهها English
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